David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292 (1997)
An agent who violates independence can avoid dynamic inconsistency in sequential choice if he is sophisticated enough to make use of backward induction in planning. However, Seidenfeld has demonstrated that such a sophisticated agent with dependent preferences is bound to violate the principle of dynamic substitution, according to which admissibility of a plan is preserved under substitution of indifferent options at various choice nodes in the decision tree. Since Seidenfeld considers dynamic substitution to be a coherence condition on dynamic choice, he concludes that sophistication cannot save a violator of independence from incoherence. In response to McClennenâs objection that relying on dynamic substitution when independence is at stake must be question-begging, Seidenfeld undertakes to prove that dynamic substitution follows from the principle of backward induction alone, provided we assume that the agentâs admissible choices from different sets of feasible plans are all based on a fixed underlying preference ordering of plans. This paper shows that Seidenfeld's proof fails: depending on the interpretation, it is either invalid or based on an unacceptable assumption.
|Keywords||Sequential choice planning independence axiom dynamic inconsistency sophisticated choice Seidenfeld, Teddy McClennen, Ned|
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Martin Peterson (2002). An Argument for the Principle of Maximizing Expected Utility. Theoria 68 (2):112-128.
Martin Peterson (2004). From Outcomes to Acts: A Non-Standard Axiomatization of the Expected Utility Principle. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):361-378.
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