Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Endorsement
| Abstract | An agent’s action counts as free only if the action is endorsed by the agent in an appropriate way, as opposed to having been merely indeterministically picked from some set of alternative possibilities, for instance by randomization or some contingency outside the agent’s control | |||||||||
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Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Close Calls and the Confident Agent: Free Will, Deliberation, and Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.
Derk Pereboom (2003). Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
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Stewart Goetz (2001). Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.
Stewart Goetz (2001). Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.
Kevin Timpe, Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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