Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Endorsement

Abstract An agent’s action counts as free only if the action is endorsed by the agent in an appropriate way, as opposed to having been merely indeterministically picked from some set of alternative possibilities, for instance by randomization or some contingency outside the agent’s control
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    Derk Pereboom (2003). Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
    Kenneth L. Pearce (2012). Thomas Reid on Character and Freedom. History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (2):159-176.
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    C. P. Ragland (2006). Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):377-394.
    Kevin Timpe, Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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