David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethics 114 (3):391-423 (2004)
The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects that are not valuable. Or vice versa: we might have reasons not to have pro-attitudes toward some valuable objects. The paper goes through several attempts to solve (or dissolve) the WKR problem and argues that none of them is fully satisfactory.
|Keywords||value fitting attitudes wrong kind of reasons WKR Scanlon Ewing Parfit ought good|
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Citations of this work BETA
Travis Timmerman (2016). Your Death Might Be the Worst Thing Ever to Happen to You (but Maybe You Shouldn't Care). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):18-37.
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Jonathan Way (2010). Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
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