Value relations

Theoria 74 (1):18-49 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract:  The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which according to Ruth Chang is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert's basic idea is attractive, the way he develops it is flawed: His modeling of values by intervals of permissible preference strengths is inadequate. Instead, I provide an alternative modeling in terms of intersections of rationally permissible preference orderings. This yields a general taxonomy of all binary value relations. The paper concludes with some implications of this approach for rational choice.
Keywords value  value comparisons  value relations  parity  incommensurability  incomparability  Chang, Ruth  Gert, Joshua  fitting-attitudes analysis of value  value analysis
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    References found in this work BETA
    C. D. Broad (1959). Five Types of Ethical Theory. Paterson, N.J.,Littlefield, Adams.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Incommensurability and Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
    Martin Peterson & Barbro Fröding (2012). Virtuous Choice and Parity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):71-82.

    View all 6 citations

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