A defense of two optimistic claims in ethical theory
Philosophical Studies 112 (1):1-30 (2003)
| Abstract | I aim to show that (i) there are good ways to argue about what has intrinsic value; and (ii) good ethical arguments needn't make ethical assumptions. I support (i) and(ii) by rebutting direct attacks, by discussing nine plausible ways to argue about intrinsic value, and by arguing for pains intrinsic badness without making ethical assumptions. If (i) and (ii) are correct, then ethical theory has more resources than many philosophers have thought: empirical evidence, and evidence bearing on intrinsic value. With more resources, we can hope to base all of our moral beliefs on evidence rather than on, say, emotion or mere intuition. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Intrinsic Value Pain Foundations of Ethics Types of Arguments Intuition | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJames Wilson (2009). Could There Be a Right to Own Intellectual Property? Law and Philosophy 28 (4):393 - 427.
Philip Brey (forthcoming). Do We Have Moral Duties Towards Information Objects? Ethics and Information Technology.
Ben A. Minteer (2001). Intrinsic Value for Pragmatists? Environmental Ethics 23 (1):57-75.
Scott Hill (2011). An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.
Erik Carlson (2001). Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
Toby Svoboda (2011). Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
Sean D. McKeever (2006). Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value:The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Ethics 116 (2):403-405.
Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
Katie McShane (2007). Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn't Give Up on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 29 (1):43-61.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads9 ( #113,941 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,320 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
