A set of solutions to Parfit's problems

Noûs 35 (2):214–238 (2001)
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit cannot find a theory of well-being that solves the Non-Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, the Absurd Conclusion, and all forms of the Mere Addition Paradox. I describe a “Quasi-Maximizing” theory that solves them. This theory includes (i) the denial that being better than is transitive and (ii) the “Conflation Principle,” according to which alternative B is hedonically better than alternative C if it would be better for someone to have all the B-experiences. (i) entails that Quasi-Maximization is not a maximizing theory, but (ii) ensures that its evaluations will often coincide with such theories.
Keywords Derek Parfit  Reasons and Persons  Theory X  The Repugnant Conclusion  Transitivity  The Non-Identity Problem  The Absurd Conclusion  The Mere Addition Paradox  Intransitivity  The Quasi-Maximizing Theory
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    Michael Huemer (2010). Lexical Priority and the Problem of Risk. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):332-351.
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