David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83 (1998)
Ethicists and economists commonly assume that if A is all things considered better than B, and B is all things considered better than C, then A is all things considered better than C. Call this principle Transitivity. Although it has great conceptual, intuitive, and empirical appeal, I argue against it. Larry S. Temkin explains how three types of ethical principle, which cannot be dismissed a priori, threaten Transitivity: (a) principles implying that in some cases different factors are relevant to comparing A to C than to comparing A to B or B to C; (b) principles of limited scope; (c) principles implying that morally relevant differences in degree can amount to differences in kind. My counterexamples employ a principle of type (c): pleasures and pains enormously different in intensity differ in kind. Temkin has also endorsed this type of counterexample, using arguments based on earlier drafts of this paper.
|Keywords||Transitivity Intransitivity Derek Parfit The Second Paradox Pain The Mere Addition Paradox The Repugnant Conclusion Larry Temkin|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Voorhoeve (2013). Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity. Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):409-425.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2012). Person-Affecting Views and Saturating Counterpart Relations. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.
Toby Handfield (2013). Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):584-604.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2012). Value Relations Revisited. Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
Campbell Brown (2011). Better Never to Have Been Believed: Benatar on the Harm of Existence. Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):45-52.
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