David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):191 – 208 (2002)
On ethical egoism, the fact that I would suffer is no reason by itself for you not to torture me. This may seem implausible—monstrous, even—but what evidence can we offer against it? Here I examine several arguments which receive some expression in Thomas Nagel’s work. Each tries to show that a normative reason to end my pain is a reason for all agents. The arguments in Section 1 emphasize reasons that don’t entail agents and thus purportedly apply to all agents. In Section 2, I examine the Argument from Dissociation, according to which my pain seems bad upon reflection, even without reflecting on its relation to me. Section 3 examines the Argument from Inability, which claims that my occurrent pains would seem bad to me, even if I couldn’t think about their relation to me. Finally, I discuss the Argument from Introspection, according to which I seem, introspectively, to have a reason to end my pain, a reason that has nothing to do with the pain’s being mine. All but one of these arguments fail utterly. The Argument from Introspection provides some grounds for rejecting egoism.
|Keywords||Egoism Thomas Nagel The View from Nowhere Reasons Pain Introspection Agent-Relativism Agent-Neutralism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John J. Tilley (2004). Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics. Philosophical Studies 118 (3):373-399.
Dean Lubin (2009). External Reasons. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):273-291.
Mark Mercer (1998). Psychological Egoism and Its Critics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):557-576.
Colin Farrelly (2003). A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism. Res Publica 9 (3):243-256.
Francesco Orsi (2008). The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses. Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.
Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
Bruce Russell (1982). On the Relation Between Psychological and Ethical Egoism. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):91-99.
Mark Mercer (2001). In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism. Erkenntnis 55 (2):217-237.
Michael Cholbi (1999). Egoism and the Publicity of Reason: A Reply to Korsgaard. Social Theory and Practice 25 (3):491-517.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #41,075 of 1,696,808 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #72,060 of 1,696,808 )
How can I increase my downloads?