Repugnance or intransitivity: A repugnant but forced choice
In The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics (2004)
| Abstract | A set of arguments shows that either the Repugnant Conclusion and its variants are true or the better-than relation isn’t transitive. Which is it? This is the most important question in population ethics. The answer will point the way to Parfit’s elusive Theory X | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesMarcia Baron (1984). The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty. Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):197-220.
Douglas W. Portmore (1999). Does the Total Principle Have Any Repugnant Implications? Ratio 12 (1):80–98.
Jesper Ryberg, The Repugnant Conclusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stuart Rachels (2001). A Set of Solutions to Parfit's Problems. Noûs 35 (2):214–238.
Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2006). On the Repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. Theoria 72 (2):126-137.
Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind 117 (468):899-933.
Stuart Rachels (2004). Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant But Forced Choice. In Jesper Ryberg Torbjorn Tannsjo (ed.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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