Six theses about pleasure

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267 (2004)
I defend these claims: (1) 'Pleasure' has exactly one English antonym: 'unpleasure.' (2) Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. (3) The hedonic calculus is a joke. (4) An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. (5) Pleasures in bad company are still good. (6) Higher pleasures aren't pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn't be higher). Thesis (1) merely concerns terminology, but theses (2)-(6) are substantive, evaluative claims
Keywords Ethics  Hedonism  Pleasure  Organic Unities  Higher Pleasures
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00028.x
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Aaron Smuts (2011). The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.
Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
Ben Bramble (2015). On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.

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