Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375 (2010)
|Abstract||In this paper, I argue that cognitive enhancement cannot be epistemically beneficial since getting things right in particular and epistemic agency in general both presuppose a kind of achievement. Drawing on Aristotle’s ethics, I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I conclude that to the extent that cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition.|
|Keywords||epistemic agency creditable vs. broadly responsible actions cognitive enhancement Aristotle virtue epistemology|
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