Beliefs, Attitudes, and Actions

Dialogue 4 (4):456-464 (1966)
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Abstract

Whether one can decide or choose to believe is a difficult problem, with important consequences for ethics. An appeal to ordinary language is not likely to be decisive. On occasion, “I choose to believe,” “he adopted the belief,” and “do not believe,” find use. Of course, one can decide or choose to pursue belief. Pascal gave a prescription for producing certain religious beliefs. There are other prescriptions for other beliefs. Is there a stronger sense in which I can decide or choose to believe? I do not use a causal recipe in performing many actions. Is there some way of choosing or deciding to believe that does not involve causal recipes.

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Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.

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