David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370 (2006)
Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the details of Hume’s naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically have thought that Hume’s view that motivation is not produced by representations, coupled with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral (virtue and vice).
|Keywords||Cognitivism Hume Internalism Metaethics Morality Motivation|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Simon Blackburn (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Williams (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press 101-113.
Stephen L. Darwall (1983). Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press.
Don Garrett (1997). Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Hsueh Qu (2012). The Simple Duality: Humean Passions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (sup1):98-116.
Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Internalists Beware—We Might All Be Amoralists! Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1 - 14.
Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
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