David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):574-598 (2011)
When is one person entitled to sanction another for moral wrongdoing? When, instead, must one mind one’s own business? Stephen Darwall argues that the legitimacy of social sanctioning is essential to the very concept of moral obligation. But, I will argue, Darwall’s “second person” theory of accountability unfortunately implies that every person is entitled to sanction every wrongdoer for every misdeed. In this essay, I defend a set of principles for differentiating those who have the standing to sanction from those who do not.
|Keywords||responsibility second person Darwall, Stephen social sanction informal sanction social punishment|
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Angela M. Smith (2015). Responsibility as Answerability. Inquiry 58 (2):99-126.
Maura Priest (2016). Blame After Forgiveness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):619-633.
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