David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):633-655 (1997)
At issue in this paper is the question of the appropriate relationship between the philosophy and history of science. The discussion starts with a brief sketch of Kuhn's approach, followed by an analysis of the so-called 'testing-theories-of-scientific-change programme'. This programme is an attempt at a more rigorous approach to the historical philosophy of science. Since my conclusion is that, by and large, this attempt has failed, I proceed to examine some more promising approaches. First, I deal with Hacking's recent views on the issues in question, particularly his notion of a 'style of reasoning'. Next, Nickle's reconstructionist interpretation of the development of science and his views on Whig history are addressed. Finally, I propose an account of philosophy as a theoretical, an interpretative and explanatory, enterprise. Thus, three alternatives to the Kuhnian paradigm are discussed, alternatives that share a recognition of the relative autonomy of philosophy from history. Hence, they assume a less tight relationship between philosophy and history of science than is the case within the Kuhnian paradigm.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Epistemology Naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press
Ian Hacking (1992). 'Style' for Historians and Philosophers. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (1):1-20.
Larry Laudan (1987). Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):19 - 31.
Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra (1986). Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research. Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.
Michel Callon & Bruno Latour (1992). Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley. In Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press 343--368.
Citations of this work BETA
Katherina Kinzel (2015). Narrative and Evidence. How Can Case Studies From the History of Science Support Claims in the Philosophy of Science? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:48-57.
Hans Radder (2008). Critical Philosophy of Technology: The Basic Issues. Social Epistemology 22 (1):51 – 70.
Hans Radder (2012). What Prospects for a General Philosophy of Science? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):89-92.
Similar books and articles
Kenneth L. Caneva (1998). Objectivity, Relativism, and the Individual: A Role for a Post-Kuhnian History of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):327-344.
Thomas Nickles (ed.) (2003). Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press.
R. E. Hendrick & Anthony Murphy (1981). Atomism and the Illusion of Crisis: The Danger of Applying Kuhnian Categories to Current Particle Physics. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):454-468.
Bojana Mladenović (2007). "Muckraking in History": The Role of the History of Science in Kuhn's Philosophy. Perspectives on Science 15 (3):261-294.
K. Shrader-Frechette (1977). Atomism in Crisis: An Analysis of the Current High Energy Paradigm. Philosophy of Science 44 (3):409-440.
William H. Austin (1972). Paradigms, Rationality, and Partial Communication. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3 (2):203-218.
Mark A. Stone (1991). A Kuhnian Model of Falsifiability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):177-185.
Leo Corry (1993). Kuhnian Issues, Scientific Revolutions and the History of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):95-117.
L. K. (1998). Objectivity, Relativism, and the Individual: A Role for a Post-Kuhnian History of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):327-344.
B. Pourciau (2000). Intuitionism as a (Failed) Kuhnian Revolution in Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):297-329.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #98,730 of 1,725,237 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,103 of 1,725,237 )
How can I increase my downloads?