Pathologically divided minds, synchronic unity and models of self

Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):658-672 (1998)
In this paper, I explore the implications of adopting one model of self rather than another in respect to one particular feature of our mental life. The need to explain synchronic unity in normal subjectivity, and also to explain the apparent and puzzling absence of synchronic unity in certain symptoms of severe mental disorder, I show, becomes more pressing with one particular model. But in the process of developing that explanation we learn something about subjectivity and perhaps also something about brain functioning
Keywords Division  Metaphysics  Mind  Model  Pathology  Self
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Elizabeth Schechter (2013). Two Unities of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):197-218.

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