Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will

Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible becuse it could not qualify as a basic intentional actions. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her other beliefs. it then shows that this assumption is alse and also that some initially plausible suggestions for weakening the assumption fail to secure Scott-Kakure's conclusion
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DOI 10.2307/2953783
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Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.

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