In Philosophical Communications. Gothenburg University (1998)
|Abstract||My analysis of the mind-body problem suggests that the mind-body problem is a "problem" because: There are discrepancies in use between scientific notions like "physical" and philosophical notions like "phenomenal character". Phenomenological conceptions of the mind are primarily used as contrast-terms in arguments against metaphysical physicalism. "Qualia" and similar terms - properly analysed - reveal that they do not, as often claimed, have a "folk-psychological" origin. Rather these terms should be described as highly sophisticated technical terms and should not be confused with non-philosophical notions expressing experiential content. Dualists are obliged to offer us a positive, thus substantive, account of what they mean by "subjective experience" and similar idioms. This is, as I shall point out, a very hard task, mainly due to the strong contrast-mode in which these terms are used. When disconnected from the paradigmatic contrast-context these terms appear more or less out of place. But when faced with a hard-core reductionism the appeal to "phenomenal qualities" seems very appropriate. In my analysis, terms like "what it is like" and "experiential character" are concept that, as such, make perfect sense, but only in a limited context. The strong contrast mode in which these terms are used, I think, also explains why it is so hard to give a satisfactory semantic account for these terms.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Philip Goff (2011). A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University
Ari Maunu (2002). Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent. Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.
Susana Nuccetelli (2004). Reference and Ethnic-Group Terms. Inquiry 47 (6):524-37.
Susana Nuccetelli (2004). Reference and Ethnic-Group Terms. Inquiry 47 (6):528 – 544.
Brook Ziporyn (2000). Setup, Punch Line, and the Mind-Body Problem: A Neo-Tiantai Approach. Philosophy East and West 50 (4):584-613.
Corine Besson (2010). Rigidity, Natural Kind Terms, and Metasemantics. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge.
J. Edwards (2003). A Reply to de Anna on the Simple View of Colour. Philosophy 78 (303):99-114.
Dan Zahavi (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.
Added to index2010-07-23
Total downloads2 ( #246,187 of 722,932 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?