David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):265-308 (2003)
This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of 'analysis' and 'synthesis' in Descartes' writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes' method is entirely captured by the term 'analysis', and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes' methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodology. I also discuss the Cartesian method in the context of other conceptions of scientific method of that era and argue that Descartes' method significantly transforms these conceptions. In the second part I argue that mathematical and natural-philosophical writings exhibit this kind of analysis. To that effect I examine in Descartes' writings on the method as used in mathematics, and Descartes' account of the discovery of the nature of the rainbow in the Meteors. Finally, I briefly assess Descartes' claim regarding the universality of his method.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Athanassios Raftopoulos (1999). Newton's Experimental Proofs as Eliminative Reasoning. Erkenntnis 50 (1):91-121.
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch (eds.) (1629). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press.
N. Jardine (1976). Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (4):277-318.
Daniel Garber (1988). Descartes and Method in 1637. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:225 - 236.
Alan Gewirtz & The Editors (1941). Experience and the Non-Mathematical in the Cartesian Method. Journal of the History of Ideas 2 (2):183.
Citations of this work BETA
Luciano Floridi (2011). A Defence of Constructionism: Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):282-304.
Similar books and articles
L. J. Koskela & M. Kagioglou, The Proto-Theory of Design: The Method of Analysis of the Ancient Geometers.
Athanasse Raftopoulos (1995). Was Cartesian Science Ever Meant to Be a Priori? A Comment on Hatfield. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):150-160.
Greg Bamford (2002). From Analysis/Synthesis to Conjecture/Analysis: A Review of Karl Popper’s Influence on Design Methodology in Architecture. [REVIEW] Design Studies 23 (3):245 - 61.
Emily Grosholz (1991). Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction. Oxford University Press.
Peter Slezak (2010). Doubts About Indubitability. Philosophical Forum 41 (4):389-412.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #147,771 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?