Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan

Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202 (2005)
Abstract In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look
Keywords Experience  Knowledge  Materialism  Metaphysics  Perception  Zombie  Graham, G  Horgan, T
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