Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan
Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202 (2005)
| Abstract | In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look | |||||||||
| Keywords | Experience Knowledge Materialism Metaphysics Perception Zombie Graham, G Horgan, T | |||||||||
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Jaegwon Kim (2002). Horgan's Naturalistic Metaphysics of Mind. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.
Olga Markic (2002). Nonreductive Materialism and the Problem of Causal Exclusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):79-88.
Danilo Suster (2002). Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy and the Case of Compatibilism. In Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan.
Danilo Suster (2002). Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy and the Case of Compatibilism. In Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.
Terence Horgan (2005). Mary Mary, "Au Contraire": Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203 - 212.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2005). Mary Mary au Contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-12.
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