David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37 - 64 (2004)
In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the Awareness Principle", viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke's arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the Awareness Principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert M. Adams (1975). Where Do Our Ideas Come From. In Stephen P. Stich (ed.), Innate Ideas. University of California Press. 71--87.
Robert L. Armstrong (1969). Cambridge Platonists and Locke on Innate Ideas. Journal of the History of Ideas 30:191-205.
Margaret Atherton (1998). Locke and the Issue Over Innateness. In Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke. Oup Oxford. 48--59.
Jonathan Barnes (1972). Mr. Locke's Darling Notion. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (88):193-214.
C. D. Broad (1975). Leibniz: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Raffaella de Rosa (2004). Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.
Brian Weatherson (1999). Begging the Question and Bayesians. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:687-697.
Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi (2005). Petitio Principii: What's Wrong? Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Begging the Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Jan-Erik Jones (2007). Locke Vs. Boyle: The Real Essence of Corpuscular Species. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (4):659 – 684.
Jennifer Faust (2008). Can Religious Arguments "Persuade&Quot;? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):71 - 86.
Victor Reppert (1992). Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question. Metaphilosophy 23 (4):378-92.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2013). In Defense of Nativism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):693-718.
Matteo Mameli & David Papineau (2006). The New Nativism: A Commentary on Gary Marcus's The Birth of the Mind. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 21 (4):559-573.
Martin Davies (2009). Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oup Oxford.
Allan Hazlett (2006). Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question. Erkenntnis 65 (3):343 - 363.
Paul K. Moser (2000). Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:209-217.
Peter Suber (1994). Question-Begging Under a Non-Foundational Model of Argument. Argumentation 8 (3):241-250.
Juho Ritola (2006). Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):565 - 583.
Michael Della Rocca (2010). PSR. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (07).
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads13 ( #129,849 of 1,140,113 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #47,589 of 1,140,113 )
How can I increase my downloads?