Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (2):159-188 (2005)
|Abstract||God’s providence appears to threaten the existence of human freedom. This paper examines why Descartes considered this threat merelyapparent. Section one argues that Descartes did not reconcile providence and freedom by adopting a compatibilist conception of freedom. Sections two and three argue that for Descartes, God’s superior knowledge allows God to providentially arrange free choices without causally determining them. Descartes’ position thus strongly resembles the “middle knowledge” solution of the Jesuits. Section four examines the problematic relationship between this solution and the creation of the eternal truths, arguing that Descartes’ position depends on his unique understanding of divine simplicity.|
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