Health and well-being

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489 (2013)
Eudaimonistic theorists of welfare have recently attacked conative accounts of welfare. Such accounts, it is claimed, are unable to classify states normally associated with physical and emotional health as non-instrumentally good and states associated with physical and psychological damage as non-instrumentally bad. However, leading eudaimonistic theories such as the self-fulfillment theory and developmentalism have problems of their own. Furthermore, conative theorists can respond to this challenge by dispositionalizing their theories, i.e., by saying that it is not merely the realization of one’s values that is non-instrumentally good for one, but that the disposition to realize one’s values is also non-instrumentally good for one. This approach, properly elaborated, can accommodate the idea that, in many cases, states normally associated with physical and psychological health (or unhealth) are non-instrumentally good (or bad). It also preserves the many well-known advantages of conative theories
Keywords Welfare  Well-being  Health  Eudaimonia  Eudaimonism  Conative theories of welfare  Flourishing  Dispositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9951-2
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Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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