The Argument from Self-Creation: A Refutation of Act-Consequentialism and a Defense of Moral Options

The standard form of act-consequentialism requires us to perform the action with the best consequences; it allows choice between moral options only on those rare occasions when several actions produce equally good results. This paper argues for moral options and thus against act-consequentialism. The argument turns on the insight that some valuable things cannot exist unless our moral system allows options. One such thing is the opportunity for individuals to enact plans for their life from among alternatives. Because planning one’s life has value, and because it requires moral options, a world governed by a moral system that admits of options is better than one governed by act-consequentialism. The paper argues that these facts entail that morality admits of a significant number of moral options; act-consequentialism is false.
Keywords utilitarianism  act-utilitarianism  act-consequentialism  consequentialism  options  prerogatives  integrity  identity
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Alex Rajczi, The Argument from Self-Creation: A Refutation of Act-Consequentialism and a Defense of Moral Options
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Joseph Mendola (2005). Consequentialism, Group Acts, and Trolleys. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):64–87.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

547 ( #607 of 1,724,891 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

76 ( #11,757 of 1,724,891 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.