Can Psychology Provide a Coherent Account of Human Behavior? A Proposed Multiexplanation-Model Theory
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavior and Philosophy 25 (1):43 - 76 (1997)
Human behavior cannot be understood by using only models of explanation utilized in the natural sciences. Multiple models of explanation, which are not consistent with, or reducible to each other, are required and are in fact used in psychology to explain human actions. This situation, called "Multiexplanation," could cause a problem of developing a justified correspondence between psychological phenomena and multiple models of explanation. Unless this problem is solved, the explanatory capability of a psychological theory seems inconsistent and ad hoc. A solution suggesting "correspondence guidelines" between phenomena and available models of explanation and "organization guidelines" for constructing a coherent psychological theory is offered. It contributes to the development of a "multiexplanation-model theory" (or a "multimodel theory" for brevity) which employs different models of explanation needed for proposing accounts of psychological phenomena.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sam S. Rakover (2012). Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):143-152.
Similar books and articles
Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
Scott R. Sehon (1998). Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.
Gordon R. Foxall (2007). Intentional Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy 35:1 - 55.
Constantine Sandis (2008). Dretske on the Causation of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
William S. Wilkerson (2001). Simulation, Theory, and the Frame Problem: The Interpretive Moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.
Lawrence Sklar (1973). Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):194-212.
Carl F. Craver (2006). When Mechanistic Models Explain. Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 113--130.
David F. Wolf Ii (1998). How Many Spaces Does It Take to Get to the Center of a Theory of Human Problem Solving? Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (4):49-55.
John Forge (1982). Towards a Theory of Models In Physical Science. Philosophy Research Archives 8:321-338.
Theodore Bach (forthcoming). Psychological Concept Acquisition. In N. Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
John D. Greenwood (1990). The Social Constitution of Action: Objectivity and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads3 ( #610,890 of 1,792,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #463,566 of 1,792,061 )
How can I increase my downloads?