Deflating existence away? A critique of Azzouni's nominalism

Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):73-83 (2009)
Yet, he also says that it is philosophically indeterminate which criterion for what exists is correct. Nominalism is the view that certain objects ( i.e ., abstract objects) do not exist, and not the view that it is philosophically indeterminate whether or not they do. I resolve the dilemma that Azzouni's claims pose: Azzouni is a non-factualist about what exists, but he is a factualist about which criterion for what exists our community of speakers has adopted. It is in the latter sense only that Azzouni can call himself a nominalist. My thanks to Jody Azzouni and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. CiteULike Connotea What's this?
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Jody Azzouni (1998). On "on What There Is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):1–18.

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