Ontology, Commitment, and Quine's Criterion

Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):271-290 (2007)
Abstract
For Quine, the ontological commitments of a discourse are what fall under its (objectual) quantifiers. The recent literature, however, is beginning to move away from this picture. There are direct challenges to Quine's criterion, and there are also attempts to provide alternatives. Azzouni suggests that the ontological commitments of a discourse should be determined by an existence predicate instead. The availability of this alternative forces an adjudication between Qune's criterion and the predicate approach to ontological commitment. I argue that to adjudicate between these criteria for ontological commitment, we need first to adjudicate between criteria for what exists
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Jonas Becker Arenhart & Décio Krause (2014). From Primitive Identity to the Non-Individuality of Quantum Objects. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46:273-282.
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