Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a prima facie tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Martin Davies (1991). Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought. In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 485-503.
Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2002). Radical Connectionism: Thinking with (Not in) Language. Language and Communication 22 (3):313-329.
Michel ter Hark (1995). Connectionism, Behaviourism, and the Language of Thought. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi
Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1997). Regress Arguments Against the Language of Thought. Analysis 57 (1):60-66.
Martin Davies (1998). Language, Thought, and the Language of Thought (Aunty's Own Argument Revisited). In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press 226.
Agustín Vicente & Fernando Martínez-Manrique (2008). Thought, Language, and the Argument From Explicitness. Metaphilosophy 39 (3):381–401.
Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Systematicity Redux. Synthese 170 (2):251 - 274.
Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1999). Where the Regress Argument Still Goes Wrong: Reply to Knowles. Analysis 59 (264):321-327.
Kenneth Aizawa (1994). Representations Without Rules, Connectionism, and the Syntactic Argument. Synthese 101 (3):465-92.
Martin Lenz (2008). Why is Thought Linguistic? Ockham's Two Conceptions of the Intellect. Vivarium 46 (3):302-317.
Renate Bartsch (1996). The Relationship Between Connectionist Models and a Dynamic Data-Oriented Theory of Concept Formation. Synthese 108 (3):421 - 454.
Paul Smolensky (1991). Connectionism, Constituency and the Language of Thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads2 ( #746,525 of 1,940,983 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?