Descriptions with an attitude problem

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):721-723 (2009)
It is well known that Russell's theory of descriptions has difficulties with descriptions occurring within desire reports. I consider a flawed argument from such a case to the conclusion that descriptions have a referring use, some responses to this argument on behalf of the Russellian, and finally rejoinders to these responses which press the point home.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.616.x
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