Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||identity sentences let us call them, can be informative.  But if, as intuition suggests, identity is a (binary) relation between objects, which holds between precisely every object and itself, then sentences of the form ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’, if true, would seem to affirm precisely the same thing of precisely the same object. The question arises: how, then, can someone can find one identity sentence more informative than another?|
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