Frege's objection to the metalinguistic view

Abstract
identity sentences let us call them, can be informative. [2] But if, as intuition suggests, identity is a (binary) relation between objects, which holds between precisely every object and itself, then sentences of the form ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’, if true, would seem to affirm precisely the same thing of precisely the same object. The question arises: how, then, can someone can find one identity sentence more informative than another?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,978
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Gerhard Nuffer (2009). Stalnaker on Mathematical Information. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):187-204.
Gerhard Nuffer (2009). Stalnaker on Mathematical Information. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):187-204.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

15 ( #107,606 of 1,100,864 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #115,533 of 1,100,864 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.