General Propositions and Causality

This article rebuts Ramsey's earlier theory, in 'Universals of Law and of Fact', of how laws of nature differ from other true generalisations. It argues that our laws are rules we use in judging 'if I meet an F I shall regard it as a G'. This temporal asymmetry is derived from that of cause and effect and used to distinguish what's past as what we can know about without knowing our present intentions.
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Cora Diamond (2011). 'We Can't Whistle It Either': Legend and Reality. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):335-356.

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