“How can a philosophical enquiry be conducted without a perpetual petitio principii?
| Abstract | In chapter 3, we reflected on the view that the fallacies on the traditional list are inherently dialectical. The answer proposed there was that, with the possible exception of, e.g., begging the question and many questions, they are not. The aim of the present chapter is to cancel theispossibility by showing that begging the question and many questions are not in fact dialectical fallacies. The reason for this is not that question-begging and many questions aren’t (at least dominantly) dialectical practices. The reason is that, dialectical or not, they are not fallacies. That begging the question, BQ for short, is a fallacy is an idea which originates with Aristotle. Given logic’s already long history, it should not be surprising that Aristotle’s views of these matters have in some ways been superseded. But the traditional view retains the original connection between conception and instantiation. Whereas BQ in Aristotle’s sense is said to be a fallacy in Aristotle’s sense, so too is BQ in the modern sense said to be a fallacy in the modern (i.e., EAUI) sense.[1] As currently conceived of, BQ and fallacies can be characterized in the following ways. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesDavid Botting (2012). Fallacies of Accident. Argumentation 26 (2):267-289.
Annamaria Schiaparelli (2003). Aristotle on the Fallacies of Combination and Division in Sophistici Elenchi 4. History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):111-129.
Polycarp Ikuenobe (2004). On the Theoretical Unification and Nature of Fallacies. Argumentation 18 (2):189-211.
D. A. Truncellito (2004). Running in Circles About Begging the Question. Argumentation 18 (3):325-329.
Christopher W. Tindale (2007). Fallacies and Argument Appraisal. Cambridge University Press.
Louise Cummings (2003). Formal Dialectic in Fallacy Inquiry: An Unintelligible Circumscription of Argumentative Rationality? Argumentation 17 (2):161-183.
Douglas N. Walton (1994). Begging the Question as a Pragmatic Fallacy. Synthese 100 (1):95 - 131.
Gregor Betz (2010). Petitio Principii and Circular Argumentation as Seen From a Theory of Dialectical Structures. Synthese 175 (3):327-349.
David Botting (2011). Can 'Big' Questions Be Begged? Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi (2005). Petitio Principii: What's Wrong? Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-04-13Total downloads34 ( #35,390 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,790 of 549,198 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
