Making Sense of Questions in Logic and Mathematics: Mill vs. Carnap

Prolegomena 5 (2):209-218 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Whether mathematical truths are syntactical (as Rudolf Carnap claimed) or empirical (as Mill actually never claimed, though Carnap claimed that he did) might seem merely an academic topic. However, it becomes a practical concern as soon as we consider the role of questions. For if we inquire as to the truth of a mathematical statement, this question must be (in a certain respect) meaningless for Carnap, as its truth or falsity is certain in advance due to its purely syntactical (or formal-semantical) nature. In contrast, for Mill such a question is as valid as any other. These differing views have their consequences for contemporary erotetic logic

Similar books and articles

Formalization of logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1943 - Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard university press.
Carnap, semantics and ontology.Gregory Lavers - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
Linguistig frameworks and metaphysical questions.James W. Comman - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):129 – 142.
Erotetic search scenarios.Andrzej Wiśniewski - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):389 - 427.
The Internal/External Question.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Grazier Philosophishe Studien 47:31-41.
Carnap, formalism, and informal rigour.Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):4-24.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-07-25

Downloads
670 (#22,210)

6 months
46 (#78,826)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Esther Ramharter
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Add more citations