Prototypes and conceptual analysis

Topoi 11 (1):59-70 (1992)
Abstract
In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work
Keywords Cognition  Cognitive Psychology  Conceptual Analysis  Intuition  Science
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