David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Lawrence Erlbaum (1991)
The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are inspired by the network-like architecture of the brain. Because of their unique architecture and style of processing, connectionist systems are generally regarded as radically different from the more traditional symbol manipulation models. This collection was designed to provide philosophers who have been working in the area of cognitive science with a forum for expressing their views on these recent developments. Because the symbol-manipulating paradigm has been so important to the work of contemporary philosophers, many have watched the emergence of connectionism with considerable interest. The contributors take very different stands toward connectionism, but all agree that the potential exists for a radical shift in the way many philosophers think of various aspects of cognition. Exploring this potential and other philosophical dimensions of connectionist research is the aim of this volume
|Keywords||Human information processing Connectionism Psychology and philosophy|
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|Buy the book||$16.00 used (87% off) $92.19 new (20% off) $115.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BF444.P45 1991|
|ISBN(s)||0805808833 9780805805925 0805805923|
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Martin Davies, Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory.
T. Goschke & Dirk Koppelberg, The Concept of Representation and the Representation of Concepts in Connectionist Models.
William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon, Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology.
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Annette Karmiloff-Smith & Andy Clark (1993). What's Special About the Development of the Human Mind/Brain? Mind and Language 8 (4):569-581.
Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology: A Reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
Christina Behme & H. S. (2008). Language Learning in Infancy: Does the Empirical Evidence Support a Domain Specific Language Acquisition Device? Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):641 – 671.
Martin Roth (2005). Program Execution in Connectionist Networks. Mind and Language 20 (4):448-467.
William Ramsey & Stephen P. Stich (1990). Connectionism and Three Levels of Nativism. Synthese 82 (2):177-205.
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