Probability and Partial Belief
In Frank Ramsey (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press (1929)
| Abstract | This note is a postscript to Ramsey's 'Truth and Probability'. It replaces that article's psychological reading of subjective probability with a reading of it as a consistency condition on the theory that we act to maximise expected utility. | |||||||||
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