Re-thinking Lewis's analysis of counterfactuals

This paper considers six comparatively neglected problems for David Lewis’s (1973; 1979) account of counterfactual conditionals (counterfactuals). Four, we shall see, can be tackled without major compromises. The remaining two objections, however, do demand a re-appraisal of Lewis’s project. One casts doubt on the account’s explanatory virtues and drives a wedge between what a counterfactual statement..
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