Singular Truth-Ascriptions: Truth-Operator vs. Truth-Predicate
| Abstract | In this paper I am concerned with the semantic analysis of sentences of the form 'It is true that p'. I will compare different proposals that have been made to analyse such sentences and will defend a view that treats these sentences as a mere syntactic variation of sentences of the form 'That p is true'. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Truth ascriptions Expletive pronouns | |||||||||
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