Towards an Expanded Epistemology for Approximations

Abstract
By stressing the act rather than the relation of approximation, I argue that the magnitude of the error introduced should not be used as the sole criterion for judging the worth of the approximation. Magnitude is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such a judgement. Controllability, the absence of cancelling errors, and the approximation's justification are also important criteria to consider when praising or blaming an approximation. Boltzmann's discussion of the types of approximations used in the kinetic theory of gases at the turn of the century illustrates the use of these criteria.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,316
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Jean-Pierre Marquis (1991). Approximations and Truth Spaces. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (4):375 - 401.
Ronald Laymon (1990). Computer Simulations, Idealizations and Approximations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:519 - 534.
Alexander Bird (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81-110.
David Miller (2005). Beauty, a Road to the Truth? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):341-355.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

1 ( #398,768 of 1,096,449 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #231,754 of 1,096,449 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.