David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2):150 (2007)
Rawls's burdens of judgment are a list of factors that explain why reasonable persons in a diverse society are likely to hold different, often incompatible, conceptions of the good. According to Charles Larmore, the burdens of judgment satisfy political liberalism's ambition of supporting liberal political principles through a minimalist moral conception. By using the burdens, we ground liberal politics in the modest notion of reasonable disagreement, avoiding reliance on controversial comprehensive notions such as autonomy, individuality, skepticism about the good, or value pluralism. In this paper I argue that the burdens of judgment cannot provide adequate support for liberal political principles unless they are read in a way that comports with Kymlicka's modest version of autonomy liberalism. As it renounces fallibilism, political liberalism's moral minimalism can be manipulated in a way that reconciles it with decidedly illiberal results. The only way to avoid this problem is to recognize that the justification of liberal principles cannot be detached from notions of fallibilism and critical reflection about the good. Ultimately, political liberalism's emphasis on moral minimalism deprives it of the conceptual resources it needs to deal with contemporary controversies concerning the defence and clarification of liberal policies
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Will Kymlicka (1989). Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality. Ethics 99 (4):883-905.
Stephen Macedo (1995). Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God V. John Rawls? Ethics 105 (3):468-496.
Leif Wenar (1995). Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique. Ethics 106 (1):32-62.
Brian Barry (1995). John Rawls and the Search for Stability. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (4):874 - 915.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
Elizabeth F. Cooke (2003). Peirce, Fallibilism, and the Science of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):158-175.
Jason Stanley (2005). Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Analysis 65 (286):126–131.
Boris Rähme (2007). Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification. In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget
Peter L. Mott (1980). Haack on Fallibilism. Analysis 40 (4):177-183.
Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
Daniel P. Sulmasy (1997). Futility and the Varieties of Medical Judgment. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 18 (1-2).
Ruth Weintraub (1993). Fallibilism and Rational Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.
Baron Reed (2002). How to Think About Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.
Stephen Hetherington (2013). Concessive Knowledge-Attributions: Fallibilism and Gradualism. Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.
Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55 - 66.
Thomas Kelly (2013). Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press
James O. Bennett (1982). Peirce and the Logic of Fallibilism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18 (4):353 - 366.
Added to index2013-11-23
Total downloads13 ( #268,614 of 1,796,448 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #168,766 of 1,796,448 )
How can I increase my downloads?