The Impossibility of Inverted Reasoners
Acta Analytica 25 (4):499-502 (2010)
| Abstract | An âinvertedâ reasoner is someone who finds the inferences we find easy, inversely difficult, and those that we find difficult, inversely easy. The notion was initially introduced by Christopher Cherniak in his book, Minimal Rationality, and appealed to by Stephen Stich in The Fragmentation of Reason. While a number of difficulties have been noted about what reasoning would amount to for such a reasoner, what has not been brought out in the literature is that such a reasoner is in fact logically impossible. This is what I hope to demonstrate in this paper | |||||||||
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