David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57 (1998)
Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’ based on a loose analogy with Newton's three laws of classical mechanics. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset as green, or feel pain as if it were an itch; second, qualia do not always produce the same behaviour: given a set of qualia, we can choose from a potentially infinite set of possible behaviours to execute; and third, qualia endure in short-term memory, as opposed to non-conscious brain states involved in the on-line guidance of behaviour in real time. We suggest that qualia have evolved these and other attributes because of their role in facilitating non-automatic, decision-based action. We also suggest that the apparent epistemic barrier to knowing what qualia another person is experiencing can be overcome simply by using a ‘bridge’ of neurons; and we offer a hypothesis about the relation between qualia and one's sense of self
|Keywords||Biology Consciousness Metaphysics Neurology Qualia Science|
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Richard J. Stevenson (2009). Phenomenal and Access Consciousness in Olfaction. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1004-1017.
Emmanuel Tannenbaum (2009). Speculations on the Emergence of Self-Awareness in Big-Brained Organisms: The Roles of Associative Memory and Learning, Existential and Religious Questions, and the Emergence of Tautologies. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):414-427.
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