Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism

Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):1-43 (2001)
Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might be accurate or inaccurate. The view of antirealist-expressivism is that such a person is in, or expresses, a conative state of mind, one that consists in a certain kind of attitude or motivational stance toward something, such as an action or a person. Realism holds that moral thoughts have truth conditions and that in some cases these truth conditions are satisfied so that our moral thoughts are true. Antirealist-expressivism holds, to a first approximation, that the distinctive moral content of a moral thought does not have truth conditions.
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DOI 10.1017/S0265052500002880
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Caj Strandberg (2015). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
Elisabeth Camp (2013). Slurring Perspectives. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.
Joshua May (2014). Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):125-141.
Nate Charlow (2014). Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.

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