A note on Ducasse's perceivable causation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):269-270 (1967)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Perception  Ducasse, C
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DOI 10.2307/2105290
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Richard M. Gale (1961). Professor Ducasse on Determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (September):92-96.
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