Modality in Computational Metaphysics

Abstract

The many worlds anthropic principle is explored here from the a priori perspective of rationalist metaphysics, within the framework of modal logic. It is shown how the apparent contradictions of quantum superposition can be thought of in terms of different levels of world models. The framework of modal logic is used, but given the rationalist assumption that all possible worlds exist. There is thus no absolute distinction between possibility and necessity. To take the point of view of a conscious being in a world, however, is to adopt some such distinction--something we must do in order to do physics. This paper is intended to lay the groundwork for future attempts to develop theories of what is necessarily true in a world with conscious entities. It also contains some tentative speculations on the difficult issue of death and quantum mechanics.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Possible Worlds for Modal Primitivists.Louis deRosset - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):109-131.
The limits of modality.Sam Cowling - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):473-495.
Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology.Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.) - 2010 - qnew York: Oxford University Press.
The metaphysics of modality.Graeme Forbes - 1985 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Relativized metaphysical modality.Adam Murray & Jessica M. Wilson - 2012 - In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 189-226.
The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory.Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43:333-363.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
2 (#1,634,744)

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Allan Randall
York University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references