David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):275-294 (2003)
Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in the way predicted by the response-dependence theorist who wishes to tie morality to emotional affect. I further argue that since response-dependence accounts that tie morality to any sort of affect (be it an emotion, a desire, a desire to desire, or so on) cannot explain the objectivity and universality of morality; and since we do not need a psychological response to play a truth-constituting role in morality in order to explain the normativity or content of morality, we should reject such response-dependence accounts
|Keywords||affect disposition emotion morality relativism response-dependence value|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Vogelstein (2016). A New Moral Sentimentalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Randel Koons (2003). Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality Are False. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):275 - 294.
Nick Zangwill (2003). Against Moral Response-Dependence. Erkenntnis 59 (3):285 - 290.
Michael Watkins & James Shelley (2012). Response-Dependence About Aesthetic Value. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):338-352.
Rafael de Clercq (2002). Two Conceptions of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177.
Rafael De Clercq (2002). Two Conceptions of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159 - 177.
Frank A. Hindriks (2006). Acceptance-Dependence: A Social Kind of Response-Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
Jason Kawall (2004). Moral Response-Dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of Duty: Responding to Zangwill. Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369.
Nathaniel Goldberg (2011). Interpreting Thomas Kuhn as a Response-Dependence Theorist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (5):729 - 752.
Jacob Busch (2006). Does the Issue of Response-Dependence Have Any Consequences for Realism? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):27-39.
Andrew Howat (2005). Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):231-253.
Alexander Miller (1998). Rule-Following, Response-Dependence, and McDowell's Debate with Anti-Realism. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications
Crispin Wright (1998). Euthyphronism and the Physicality of Colour: A Comment on Mark Powell's Realism or Response-Dependence?. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications
Ralph Wedgwood (1997). The Essence of Response-Dependence. European Review of Philosophy 3:31-54.
Sebastian Lutz (2010). Concept Formation in Ethical Theories: Dealing with Polar Predicates. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2010 (August):1-8.
Added to index2010-09-01
Total downloads12 ( #318,322 of 1,938,961 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #293,948 of 1,938,961 )
How can I increase my downloads?