Abstraction and unrealistic assumptions in economics∗

Journal of Economic Methodology 3 (2):215-236 (1996)
Economics has been persistently criticized for its heavy reliance on unrealistic assumptions. Some people reply to this criticism by saying that the unrealistic assumptions of economics result from abstraction from unimportant details, and abstraction is necessary for knowledge of a complex real world. So, far from unrealistic assumptions detracting from the epistemic worth of economics, such assumptions are essential for economic knowledge. I call this line of argument ?the Abstractionist Defense?. After clarifying abstraction, unrealistic assumptions and kindred notions, I show that the Abstractionist Defense does not successfully rebut the position of those who criticize economics for its unrealistic assumptions.
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DOI 10.1080/13501789600000016
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References found in this work BETA
Carl G. Hempel (1966). Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Uskali Mäki (1994). Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 38:147-168.

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