Computer processes and virtual persons: Comments on Cole's "artificial intelligence and personal identity"
|Abstract||This is a draft of the written version of comments on a paper by David Cole, presented orally at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting in New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Following the written comments are 2 appendices: One contains a letter to Cole updating these comments. The other is the handout from the oral presentation|
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