Explaining moral weakness
Philosophical Studies 24 (3):174-182 (1973)
| Abstract | I will contend against Davidson that weak actions are susceptible to rational explanation and that the view that they are not is traceable to a misconception of the requirements for explaining conduct by citing the agent's reasons for acting. | |||||||||
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