Meinongian theories and a Russellian paradox
Noûs 12 (2):153-180 (1978)
| Abstract | This essay re-examines Meinong's "Über Gegenstandstheorie" and undertakes a clarification and revision of it that is faithful to Meinong, overcomes the various objections to his theory, and is capable of offering solutions to various problems in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox (now known as "Clark's Paradox") that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons. | |||||||||
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A. K. Jorgensen (2004). Types of Negation in Logical Reconstructions of Meinong. Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):21-36.
Karel Lambert (1974). Impossible Objects. Inquiry 17 (1-4):303 – 314.
André Fuhrmann (2002). Russell's Way Out of the Paradox of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):197-213.
André Fuhrmann (2002). Russell's Way Out of the Paradox of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):197-213.
Pierdaniele Giaretta (2009). The Paradox of Knowability From a Russellian Perspective. Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158.
William J. Rapaport (1979). An Adverbial Meinongian Theory. Analysis 39 (March):75-81.
William J. Rapaport (1991). Meinong, Alexius; I: Meinongian Semantics. In Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Philosophia Verlag.
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